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places a harsh burden on hotelkeepers notwithstanding the fact that
it also gives them an opportunity to limit their common law liability
through positive action.
What are the needs of modem society that make it necessary
to impose upon hotelkeepers a rule that served its purpose well in
the days when the highways of England were infested with bandits,
and when inns were as much places of protection as places of sus-
tenance and rest? It is suggested that this rule of the common law
has outlived its usefulness and that when the reason for the rule
ceases, the rule itself should cease.
K. H. L.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
SUBROGATION RIGHTS OF EMPLOYER
BARRED AS AGAINST STATUTORY
CO-EMPLOYEES
Rea v. Ford,' a recent decision handed down by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, places Virginia with a small minority
of states in respect to the question: Is a sub-contractor amenable to
suit when an employee of the principal contractor is injured due
to the negligence of the sub-contractor or his agent? Virginia,
along with Massachusetts and Florida, holds that the sub-contrac-
tor is not amenable to suit.
The facts of the instant case showed that the principal con-
tractor rented a crane and its crew from a sub-contractor for
work on a construction project. During this work, due to negligence
of either the sub-contractor or his agent, or both, an industrial
accident occurred resulting in the death of one of the principal
contractor's employees. 2 Decedent's widow asserted her claim for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against
the principal contractor and his insurance carrier. An award was
entered in her favor by the industrial commission from which no
appeal was taken.'.
1 198 Va. 712, 96 S.E.2d 92 (1956).
2 Although agency and negligence questions arose, the court failed to discuss
them.
3 Evidence appeared that the sub-contractor, Ford, had accepted and com-
plied with the act.
This suit was instituted by the insurance carrier of the prin-
cipal contractor, in the name of Rea's administratrix, against the
sub-contractor, Ford. It was brought under the provisions of the
Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act 4 which provides for the
subrogation of employer to employee's rights against third parties
when a lawful claim has been made against the employer under
the Act.
The court in determining the sub-contractor's non-amenability
to suit relied upon the following sections of the Virginia Work-
men's Compensation Act:-
Section 65-37. The rights and remedies herein grant-
ed to an employee shall exclude all other rights and rem-
edies of such employee, his personal representative, parents,
dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise,
on account of such injury, loss of service or death.
Section 65-38. The making of a lawful claim against
an employer for compensation under this Act for the injury
or death of his employee shall operate as an assignment
to the employer of any right to recover damages which
the injured employee or his personal representative or
other person may have against any other party for such
injury or death, and such employer shall be subrogated to
any such right and may enforce, in his own name or in the
name of the injured employee or his personal representa-
tive, the legal liability of such other party...
Section 65-99. Every employer subject to the com-
pensation provisions of this act shall insure the payment of
compensation to his employees in the manner hereinafter
provided. While such insurance remains in force he or
those conducting his business shall only be liable to an em-
ployee for personal injury or death by accident to the
extent and in the manner here specified. [Emphasis
added.]
The common employment interpretation of Feitig v. Chalkley6
and Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng. Co.' is again used to define "a
stranger to the employment" with the result that a sub-contractor
who had not even been present or given instructions as to how,
4 Va. Code §65-38 (1950).
5 Va. Code §§65-37, 38, 99 (1950).
6 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E. 2d 73 (1946).
186 Va. 116, 41 S.E. 2d 469 (1947).
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when, or where to work is held not to be a stranger to the em-
ployment.
In the Feitig case, supra, it was held that a fellow employee
is not an "other party" within the meaning of Section 65-38 and
thus is not subject to an action at law for damages as a result of
his own negligence. The court arrived at this immunity to suit for
the co-employee by giving the words in the phrase "he (the em-
ployer) or those conducting his business" s what they felt was a
"usual and ordinary meaning." [Emphasis added.] The court ap-
peared to consider that any and all employees of an employer were
conductors of the employer's business.9
Further, the court in interpreting an amendment to the stat-
ute,' ° which provided for the assignment to the employer of the
right to recover damages which the injured party might have
against "any other party," said that since immunity was granted
tp a co-employee in Section 11 of the 1918 Act (now Section
65-99), then the intention in the amendment to Section 12 of the
1918 Act in 1920 (now Sections 65-37, 65-38), must be that "any
other party" refers to one outside the employer-employee relation-
ship. The unfortunate choice of words the Court used to describe
this situation was "a stranger to the business. ' " The court lays the
ground work for extending the area of immunity by stating that
"the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive in so far as it
covers the field of industrial accidents, but no further."' 2 The im-
plication is that the only remedy for one injured in an industrial
accident is the remedy afforded by the Workmen's Compensation
Act. However, the court neglected to state that in Griffith v. Raven
Red Ash Coal Co. the court was talking about remedies against the
employer, and not about remedies against a negligent co-employee
or sub-contractor. Thus any action arising from an industrial ac-
8 Va. Code §65-99 (1950).
9 Rather than this strained interpretation, it would seem more ordinary and
usual that such words would suggest immunity for those in a supervisory
capacity, i.e., vice-principals, and not merely those performing the em-
ployer's work. North Carolina in giving an ordinary meaning to such
words as "those conducting his business" arrives at an opposite con-
clusion, holding that such does not include a co-employee. Tscheiller v.
National Weaving Co., 214 N.C. 449, 199 S.E. 623 (1938).
'0 Va. Code §65-38 (1950).
"1 Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96 at 102, 38 S.E.2d 73 at 75 (1946).
12 Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 20 S.E.2d 530 (1942).
cident against the employer other than that allowed under the
Workmen's Compensation Act is barred unless the accident occured
outside the industrial field."3 The court states that the purpose of
the Act was to cast the loss upon the business as an ultimate expense
thereof."' 4 Was this the purpose? Or was it merely an equitable way
for reaching the main purpose of Workmen's Compensation Acts-
to benefit the workman by awarding him compensation where
previously none could be obtained. 5
The court concluded by saying that the underlying principle
was stated by Chief Justice Rugg thus:' 6
One purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act
was to sweep within its provisions all claims for com-
pensation flowing from personal injuries arising out of and
in the course of employment by a common employer in-
sured under the act, and not to preserve for the benefit of
the insurer or of the insurer and those injured liabilities
between those engaged in the common employment which
but for the act would exist at common law. That is the
broad ground underlying the decisions already cited."
'3 Such intention and purpose is clearly evident in Section 65-37. But as to
the extension of such immunity to co-employees and subcontractors,
the purpose first appeared in the minds of the court-not the legislature.
There is no apparent justification for construing that the purpose of the
Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act is to make the only remedy of
the employee for any accident occuring within the industrial field the
remedy prescribed by the Act. The intent was to affect the relation be-
tween the employer and his employee and not that relation between
employee-employer, or employee-second-contractor.
14 185 Va. 96 at 99, 38 S.E.2d 73 at 74 (1946).
'5 Humphreys v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S.E. 890 (1926).
16 Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593 at 597, 190 N.E. 815 at 817 (1934).
" It is interesting to note, that the then Under Secretary of Labor, Arthur
Larson, in criticizing the manner in which Massachusetts arrived at the
same holding as Virginia as to a sub-contractor's non-amenability to
suit was especially critical of the afore-mentioned quotations of C. J.
Rugg. (Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 2, 1956,
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., Albany, N. Y., Sections 72.32, 72.33).
Massachusetts, under a statute permitting a third party action "where
the injury for whch compensation is payable was caused under circum-
stances creating a legal liability in some other person than the insured"
(Mass.G.L. [ter ed.] c. 152 Section 15), began with the idea that only
the insured (i.e. the employer) is granted immunity and ended up with
the result that the employer's employee is given immunity (Caira v.
Caira, 296 Mass. 448, 6 N.E.2d 431 (1923).) The rather anamolous
result reached by the Massachusetts court is that an employer is held to
mean employee. The Massachusetts court had no more qualms about
legislating than the Virginia court did, especially when the result ap-
pealed to the court's conscience.
Virginia took her next step in Sykes v. Stone & Webster En-
gineering Corporation,8 where the court held that there can be
no action at law against the principal contractor for the wrongful
death of an employee of the sub-contractor. The reasoning of the
court is that the principal contractor is not a stranger to the em-
ployment and the work. Thus the court applies a catch phrase of
the Feitig case without contemplating the original connotation of
the words. What was originally meant to describe one outside the
employer-employee relationship is now glibly said to embrace all
those in the common employment. This extension in meaning is
largely responsible for the plunge overboard in the instant case.
Upon consideration of the opinion of the court in the instant
case, it is questionable whether the court realized that by so hold-
ing they were reaching such a minority result. Indeed, by read-
ing the above code section with the intent and purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act in mind, one is hard pressed to
realize how the court arrived at such a holding. It would appear
that the court is striving to make all who come under the canopy
of the Workmen's Compensation Act immune from any common
law liability and, in addition, to limit the remedy of the injured
parties to recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The
Court fails to mention what the result might be in other jurisdic-
tions. In fact, by stating that this case is the converse of the Sykes
case, the court seems to mislead itself. Granted, that as far as
parties are concerned, it is the converse.' 9 But as to the legal
proposition involved, there is a distinction. In the Sykes case, the
injured employee can elect to receive his workmen's compensation
from either the sub-contractor or the principal contractor but if
the principal contractor is forced to pay he is entitled to indemnity
from the sub-contractor. 20 However, in the present case the em-
ployee has no election. If he is to receive his benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, he must proceed against the prin-
cipal contractor. As far as liability is concerned, the sub-contractor
is a total stranger-he has no fear of a common law action, and
has no responsibility under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
18 186 Va. 116,41 S.E.2d 469 (1947).
19 Principal contractor's employee against sub-contractor in the Rea case as
opposed to sub-contractor's employee against principal contractor in
the Sykes case.
20 Va. Code §65-30 (1950).
Insofar as they have gone, the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has reached decisions which are in line with most other
jurisdictions with similar type acts and which seem to give the
more desirable results. Workers in the industrial field, especially
extra-hazardous fields, not only are subjected to the risks of injury,
but also there is a great risk that they will negligently injure a
co-employee. Thus if his own negligence can cost him thousands of
dollars in damages, the beneficial effects of workmen's compensa-
tion might be affected by the potential liabilities which confront
the worker.
2 1
Forty-one states now have statutes which provide that the
principal contractor shall be liable for compensation to the em-
ployee of an uninsured sub-contractor under him doing work which
is a part of the principal contractor's. 22 Thus, in effect, for pur-
poses of compensation, the principal contractor is made a statutory
employer of the sub-contractor's employee. It follows that the prin-
cipal contractor's employee is in effect made a statutory co-
employee. There is a statutory employer-employee relationship be-
tween the principal contractor and the sub-contractor's employee
giving immunity to the principal contractor from an action at law
based on the negligence of the principal contractor. Also, on the
basis of the aforementioned reasoning as to immunity of co-em-
ployee, there should be immunity granted to the statutory co-
employee. Such results seem to be the modern trend and it is con-
ceivable that in the near future most states will have statutes ex-
pressly granting immunity to such parties.
Virginia is, however, doing this by questionable judicial legis-
lation, the first of which appeared in Feitig v. Chalkley,2  was
later enlarged in Sykes v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.,24
and culminated in the instant case.
Unless there is an express provision granting immunity to all
within the common employment, or all who come under the Act,
there is no justification for holding the sub-contractor, whose negli-
gence injures the employee of the principal contractor, immune
from suit at law. There is no employee-employer relation! There
21 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §72.20 (1956).
22 Ibid. And see §72-31.
23 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946).
24 Supra at note 18.
can be no recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act from
the sub-contractor (in fact in a majority of cases the sub-contractor
does not even carry insurance-one of the reasons for the amend-
ment allowing the sub-contractor's employee to recover under the
act'from either the sub-contractor or the principal contractor!) A
tortfeasor should not be allowed to escape liability for his own
wrongdoing.2 5
The easiest remedy for this situation would be for the court
to correct itself. But in so doing, it will have to again indulge in
judicial legislation or else lag behind the modem concept of work-
men's compensation, with the end result that the legislature will
have to make amendments. Therefore the most expeditious and
proper remedy would be for the legislature to step in and expressly
manifest the course it wishes the courts to follow. The writer is not
prepared at this time to advocate remedial measures for the legis-
lature to follow. There are valid arguments on both sides of the
question. The writer's main complaint is the process the court used
in arriving at the decision-not the decision itself.
C.R.C.
25 Rehn v. Bingham, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856 (1949) per Chappell, J.
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